Abstract -'Sortalism about demonstrative reference' is the view that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity to classify them according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism. §1 distinguishes two sortalist views. §2 argues that one of them is false. §3 argues that the other is true. §4 uses the argument from §3 to develop a new response to the objection to sortalism from examples where we seem to succeed in referring even though we get sortal classification wrong, or do not attempt to classify at all.
'Sortalism about demonstrative reference' (hereafter just 'sortalism') is the view that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity to classify them according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism. The paper has four parts. §1 distinguishes two sortalist views. §2 argues that one of them is false. §3 argues that the other is true. §4 uses the argument for sortalism from §3 to develop a new response to an old and intuitive objection to sortalism -the objection from the claim that sortalism is disproved by examples where we succeed in referring even though we get sortal classification wrong, or do not (apparently) attempt to classify at all.
I shall restrict the discussion to cases of 'perceptual demonstrative reference' -cases where you are in a position to refer to an object using 'this' or 'that' in virtue of a current perceptual link with it. I take these to be the central cases of demonstrative reference. There are hard questions about how what I say in this paper might extend to less central cases, for example, use of 'this' or 'that' to refer to something you remember, or to complex demonstrative reference (reference using terms like 'that tree' and 'that dog'). But it is not possible to consider these questions here. §1 Appropriation Sortalism vs. Rich Referential Sortalism
As a first step towards the distinction between sortalist views that I want to introduce, consider the following accounts of what it takes for a speaker to be using an expression to 'refer to' an object. : S is using α to 'refer to' o (in a context) iff S's intention, in using α in the context, is at least to introduce o for the rest of the sentence containing α to say something about.
(Note that this distinction between rich and minimal senses of 'refer' is a distinction at the level of 'speaker's referent' as opposed to 'semantic referent'. A token expression's 'speaker's referent' is the object the speaker intends to be talking about in using it. A token expression's 'semantic referent' is the object that the linguistic conventions associated with the expression together with relevant features of context determine as its contribution to whether the sentence containing it is true. 2 It is a familiar observation that speaker's referent and semantic referent may be distinct. For example, suppose that you nod towards a man who looks like Russell and say 'Bertrand Russell is paying the bill for the whole table'. Then the speaker's referent for your token use of 'Bertrand Russell' is the man you are indicating, even though the semantic referent for your use of this term is Russell. My concern in this paper is with what kind of relation between speaker and object is required if the object is to be the speaker's referent of a token perceptual demonstrative used by a subject. Nothing I have to say here requires taking sides with respect to how possible divergences between speakers' referential intentions and linguistic convention should be treated. Throughout the paper, 'α refers to o' should be read as 'o is the speaker's referent of α'.)
Borrowing some terminology from the literature on complex demonstratives 3 , I shall say that there is an object 'appropriated' by S's use of an expression iff as a result of this use the object is introduced as relevant to the conversation from S's point of view. In these terms, the minimal account says that appropriation is both necessary and sufficient for reference, while the rich account says that appropriation is necessary but not sufficient for reference. According to the rich account, a use of α that appropriates o is a referring use iff it introduces o as the thing the proposition S intends to communicate 4 is about.
Given the two accounts of reference, and the notion of appropriation, the two sortalist views that I want to consider can be introduced like this:
First sortalist view: 'Appropriation sortalism' -the view that the capacity to refer demonstratively depends on the capacity to classify because the capacity to appropriate objects depends on the capacity to classify them.
Second sortalist view: 'Rich referential sortalism'-the view that the capacity to appropriate objects does not depend on the capacity to classify them, but the capacity to refer demonstratively depends on the capacity to classify because the capacity to use a demonstrative to say something about an object depends on the capacity to classify it.
If appropriation sortalism is true, even the capacity for minimal reference depends on the capacity to classify. If rich referential sortalism is true, the capacity for rich reference depends on the capacity to classify, but the capacity for minimal reference does not.
The next two sections argue that appropriation sortalism is false and rich referential sortalism is true. §2 Appropriation Sortalism is False
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Appropriation sortalism is the view that the capacity to refer demonstratively depends on the capacity to classify because the capacity to appropriate objects depends on the capacity to classify them. I shall suppose that you are in a position to appropriate o iff you are in a position to attach an expression to o as intended referent, and that your perceptual processing puts you in a position to attach an expression to o as intended referent iff it presents you with o as a possible object of cognition -a thing that you might go on to have a thought about. Given these suppositions, appropriation sortalism stands or falls with the claim that our perceptual systems present us with particulars as possible objects of cognition only with the aid of our capacities for conceptual classification. And there is strong empirical evidence that this claim is false.
The first part of this section sets out some of the relevant empirical evidence. The second considers in more detail how this evidence impacts on appropriation sortalism.
The relevant empirical evidence concerns the nature of visual selective attention.
'Selective attention' is the process by which a specific part of the visual field is highlighted as a part information from which is available for conceptual thought. For example, you can see a large number of words on this page. All the words you can see are in your visual field. But at each moment you will be able to tell what only a few of the words are. The words you are currently in a position to recognise are the ones you are currently attending
to. Because what you are attending to determines which aspects of what is presented in your visual field you are in a position to think about, the processes involved in preparing the field over which attention roams, and in locking attention to one part of this field, are pre-conceptual. But psychologists have amassed strong evidence that visual selective attention is often directed to objects (in some sense of 'object'). Since attention is the gatekeeper for conceptual thought, this is evidence for the claim that our capacities to parse scenes into objects, and select particular objects as potential objects of thought, are preconceptual too: if attention delivers up objects for conceptual thought, our perceptual processing can parse scenes into objects and lock onto specific objects before conceptualisation, and, in particular, classification under sortal concepts, come into play.
Here is some of the evidence for the claim that attention is often directed at objects (in some sense of 'object') that psychologists have found. In a basic 'automatic spread of attention' experiment, subjects are presented with either two ( fig.1 ) or three ( fig. 2 ) rectangles arranged as shown. A spotlight is used to make a spot where the 'C' is. The spot disappears. Immediately afterwards there is a 'luminance decrement' (a gradual darkening) either at the point marked 'S' or at the point marked 'D'
(so either on the same rectangle as the initial cue or on a different rectangle). It turns out that we are much faster at detecting a decrement on the same rectangle as the initial cue than on a different rectangle. The effect cannot be caused by a difference in distance from the initial cue, because the 'D' and the 'S' are equidistant from the 'C'. Rather, it seems that attention is attracted by the initial cue, then spreads out to the boundaries of the shape the cue is on. And attention is not just spreading until it hits a solid line on every side. For the effect remains in fig. 2 cases, where the rectangles where the action is taking place are partially occluded. Rather, the boundaries to which attention is spreading seem to be object boundaries -boundaries around one thing which is seen as lying behind another.
§2.2 Second piece of evidence -amodal completion
'Amodal completion' is the process by which shapes are completed into apparent objects. For example, consider fig. 3: fig. 3 (from Driver et. al 2002) When you look at fig. 3 , your visual system completes the partially visible circle into a full circle that you see as lying behind an occluding square. Now consider fig. 4 and fig. 5 . And suppose that in each case you are asked to find the notched circle. fig. 4 (from Driver et. al 2002) fig. 5 (from Driver et. al 2002) The notched circle is much harder to find in fig. 5 than in fig. 4 . And it has been found that this gap between fig. 5 type cases and fig. 4 type cases increases with the number of distracters in the diagram. The more extra shapes are in the frame, the harder it is to find the target shape in a fig. 5 type case. In fig. 4 type cases the frame has to get really big (so that you cannot take it in at a glance) or the shapes have to get really small before the notched circle ceases to jump out at you. Psychologists have concluded that the reason the notched circle is harder to find in fig. 5 is that amodal completion is pre-attentive. When you look at fig. 4 , your pre-attentive processing delivers a field which contains a notched circle. This notched circle can then grab your attentional spotlight as it goes by. In contrast, when you look at fig. 5 , your pre-attentive processing fills in the missing part of the notched circle. So the field over which your attention roams does not contain a notched circle. It contains a partially occluded full circle instead. To find the notched circle you have to attend to each shape in turn, looking to see if it contains a 'hidden' notched circle.
That is why the target shape is so much harder to find in fig. 5 than in fig. 4 , and why the gap increases with increasing numbers of distracters.
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But amodal completion is completion into objects: when you look at fig. 5 , your visual system completes the notched circle into a full circle seen as lying behind a square.
So if attention roams over a field in which amodal completion has already taken place, our pre-conceptual processing is delivering a world already divided into objects of some kind.
§2.3 Third piece of evidence -multiple object tracking
The final piece of empirical evidence I shall present concerns the relative efficiency of attentive and pre-attentive processing. It is generally accepted that pre-attentive processing is much more efficient than post-attentive processing. Sub-personal, preattentive, information processing is fast and has enormous capacities. In contrast, our dealings with information after attention has selected it as available for conceptual thought are slow and have relatively small capacities. The more conceptual-level tasks you attempt at once, the slower you will get 9 . But parsing the visual field into objects seems to share the efficiency of pre-attentive processing. So parsing into objects seems to be pre-attentive.
The main experiments which have been taken to establish this result involve 'multiple object tracking'. In multiple object tracking experiments, subjects are shown a display containing a number of identical dots. Some dots are 'flashed' to distinguish them from the others (a). The dots then move randomly around the display (b). When the motion stops the subject is asked to say whether a given dot flashed at the outset (c).
(from If parsing into apparent objects were post-attentive (so cognition-involving), you would expect us to be much better at this task when asked to track only one than when asked to track two, and worse at tracking three than tracking two, and worse again at tracking four.
But it turns out that our performance does not fall off in this way. We are as good at keeping track of two, three, or four things as we are at keeping track of one. At five the capacity seems to hit overload and beyond five it falls off suddenly. And this pattern of falling off -uniform success up to some point at which the system's capacity is reachedis the pattern characteristic of pre-attentive, not post-attentive, processing. So it seems that pre-attentive processing is already serving up a scene parsed into objects that we then attend to. 10 
§2.4 The argument for the falsity of appropriation sortalism
With this empirical evidence in place, the argument for the falsity of appropriation sortalism can be stated like this: 5, 6] To consolidate the case against appropriation sortalism, it is useful to consider how the empirical evidence described in this section impacts on one traditional argument for sortalism: the argument from the claim that pointing is ambiguous. Philosophers advancing this argument say that the referent of a demonstrative is fixed by a mental or physical act of pointing which singles out one object as salient. But, they say, mental or physical pointing can single out a determinate object only if accompanied by a specification of kind.
If I just point without specifying a kind, there will be no boundaries around the spatiotemporal part of the world I am pointing to. And in this case I cannot count as pointing at a unique object -there is nothing to make it the case that I am pointing at the chair across the room, rather than the arm of the chair, or the point on the chair's arm that a line emerging from the end of my pointing finger would hit, or a momentary temporal stage of the chair, or the mereological sum of the chair and the table at which it is placed, or the bit of metal of which the chair is made (which may survive a change in which the chair itself is destroyed, or be destroyed by a change the chair survives). According to philosophers who advocate sortalism on the ground that unsupplemented pointing is ambiguous, the role of sortal concepts in enabling us to achieve demonstrative reference is to remove this ambiguity. These philosophers think of mental and physical pointing as having a two-part structure. First we indicate a direction. Then we provide a sortal concept to draw spatiotemporal boundaries around a part of the world in that direction. The object pointed at is the object with these spatio-temporal boundaries.
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The empirical evidence I have set out in this section undermines this traditional argument's central premiss -the claim that conceptually unaided mental or physical pointing is ambiguous. For this evidence suggests that our pre-conceptual processing parses the visual field into visual objects. So it suggests that the boundaries that proponents of the traditional argument think sortal concepts draw are already there in the preconceptual deliverances of our perceptual systems. And in that case, mental and physical pointing do not have the two-part structure (indicate a general direction; provide a sortal concept to draw a boundary in that general direction) that proponents of the traditional sortalist argument supposed. 'Mental pointing' is attending to a visual object. Physical pointing serves to direct attention to a visual object. When you attend to a visual object there is a fact of the matter about the spatio-temporal spread of your attention. For example, if you are attending just to the arm of the chair, you will be quick to notice changes occurring on the chair's arm, and slow to notice changes on the chair's leg.
(Compare the 'automatic spread of attention' experiments: if you are attending just to the chair's arm, the boundaries around the chair's arm are functioning like the boundaries of the initially cued rectangle in one of these experiments. Your information processing favours the attended region, so you are quicker at picking up changes within it.) Similarly, it is only if you were attending to the piece of metal of which the chair was made, rather than to the chair itself, that you would be able to keep attending through a change that the piece of metal but not the chair survives.
So the empirical evidence suggests that both appropriation sortalism, and the central premiss in the traditional 'pointing is ambiguous' argument for sortalism, are false.
Our pre-conceptual processing has already worked out where the boundaries around the objects we are pointing (or attending) to are before conceptual thought comes to the table.
§3 Rich Referential Sortalism is True
Recall the rich definition of 'refer' from §1: S is using α to 'refer to' o (in a context) iff S's intention, in using α's in the context is at least to introduce o for the rest of the sentence containing α to say something about. 'Rich referential sortalism' is the view that the capacity to refer in this rich sense depends on the capacity to classify. The argument for rich referential sortalism that I want to present goes like this. (For economy of expression, from now on I shall use 'refer' in the rich sense only unless otherwise stated.)
1 To refer to an object you have to be in a position to say things, right or wrong, about it.
2 To be in a position to say things, right or wrong, about an object you have to be in a position to ascribe properties to it.
3 Our capacities to ascribe properties to objects depend on our capacities to classify them. So 4 Our capacities to refer to objects depend on our capacities to classify them.
1 follows from the rich definition of 'refer'. I take 2 to be analytic: to 'say something about' an object just is to ascribe a property to it
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. The argument is valid. So to use the argument to establish its conclusion it remains to establish 3 -the claim about the sortal dependence of property ascription.
As it stands, 3 is ambiguous between a strong reading 3a The capacity to ascribe a property to o depends on knowledge which kind of thing o is.
and a weak reading 3b The capacity to ascribe a property to o depends on knowledge that o is a thing of some determinate kind, but not knowledge which kind this actually is.
This ambiguity in 3 generates a corresponding ambiguity between strong and weak sortalist conclusions:
4a (Strong sortalism) S can refer to o only if there is some kind κ such that S knows that o belongs to κ.
4b (Weak sortalism) S can refer to o only if S knows that, for some kind κ, o belongs to κ.
The argument for the sortal dependency of property ascription that I am going to present is an argument for 3b. So it contributes to establishing weak sortalism (4b), rather than strong sortalism (4a). I shall consider the importance of the distinction between strong and weak sortalism when I discuss the intuitive anti-sortalist objection in §4.
The argument for the sortal dependency of property ascription takes its rise from the need to solve an old puzzle about what constitutes a genuine property. The puzzle goes like this.
Suppose
Generosity about properties -for every predicate, Φ, there is a property F such that an
This generous criterion entails that objects have many properties that we do not ordinarily consider. For example, it entails that at the time of writing I have not only the properties of being human and being 170 cm tall, but also the properties of being shorter than my younger brother, being such that George W. Bush is president of the United States, and being either 160cm tall or such that Toronto is the capital of Ontario. In addition, suppose
Generosity about change -o changes between times t1 and t2 iff, for some property F, o has F at t1 but not at t2, or has F at t2 but not at t1.
Generosity about change combines with generosity about properties to entail that objects undergo many more changes than we ordinarily think they do. For example, this combination entails that I changed when my younger brother grew taller than me (I acquired the property of being shorter than him) and I will change when George Bush ceases to be president (I will lose the property of being such that George Bush is president).
It is a terminological question whether to allow that the generous definitions are really defining legitimate notions of 'property' and 'change'. But the examples show that the generous notions of 'property' and 'change' are not our ordinary notions. We ordinarily take it that being human and being 170 cm tall are 'properties' of objects in a way that being such that George Bush is president is not. And we ordinarily take it that when George Bush ceases to be president or my brother grows taller than me they (not I) are the ones who change. So our ordinary notions of 'property' and 'change' are much more restricted than the generous notions. . Causal relations are generally taken to be relations between events. But they are relations that hold in virtue of the objects which participate in the related events and these objects' properties. One event causes
another iff the objects involved are such that a change in one object's properties brings about a change in another's. So, for example, X's pulling of the trigger causes Y's death in virtue of the fact that a change in one of X's properties (the amount of pressure X is exerting on the trigger) brings about change in Y's properties. Philosophers looking for an anchor for the favoured status of ordinary properties have pointed out the connection between the notions of cause, change, and property. And they have argued that only ordinary properties and ordinary change relate to causation in a way that respects this connection. So the suggestion is that, for example, my ceasing to be such that George Bush is president can never be causally relevant in the way that changes in ordinary properties are.
Of course, it would be open to define a notion of 'generous causation' which would count generous properties as causally relevant and generous changes as causes and effects.
The appeal to the connection between the notions of cause, change, and property to secure the status of ordinary properties owes its attractiveness to the fact that it seems much more obvious that 'generous causation' would not be real causation than it is that a generous property is not a real property, or a generous change not a real change. For we appeal to causal relations to explain why events in the world unfold the way they do. And a 'generous' notion of causation would be a notion of causation without explanatory power.
There are many questions about how this connection between the ordinary notions of property and change and the notion of causation is to be made out. But I want to say just enough about the causal account of the status of ordinary properties to show how it entails the sortal dependency of property ascription. And all that is required for this purpose is the general claim that the special status we assign genuine properties rests on our taking it that an object's genuine properties, and not its spurious properties, contribute to determining its causal path through the world.
As a first step towards showing how this general claim generates the sortal dependency of property ascription, let us make it more precise. The causal implications, for an object, of possessing a property always depend on which other properties the object has.
For example, a boulder's being round entails that it will roll down a plane inclined at a given angle and with a given surface iff it is also heavy, rigid, and smooth enough to roll given the angle and surface of the plane (and has no other property which would stop it rolling under the circumstances). An artefact's being made of iron entails that it will, usually, cut wood if it has a sharp edge (and is constructed strongly enough), that it will hold water if it has an appropriate shape, that it will dissolve in acid at a given rate, depending on its surface area, and so on. Possession of a property endows an object with . The CRP is also neutral with respect to whether we must appeal to conditional causal powers to individuate genuine properties. The claim is only that the genuine properties endow objects with conditional causal powers. So, for example, it is consistent with the CRP to say that the property of being spherical is individuated purely geometrically (it is the property of having a volume determined by a specific equation), but that sphericality owes its status as a genuine property to the causal difference that it makes. Now let us ask exactly how the notion of a conditional causal power must be understood if the CRP is to provide a solution to the problem about the status of ordinary properties.
If the CRP is to provide a solution to this problem, the notion of 'conditional causal power' must be understood in such a way that spurious properties (like being fifty miles south of a burning barn and being such that George Bush is president) do not endow things with any. So, for example, the following will not do as an elucidation of the notion of a conditional causal power:
(CCP1) Possession of property F endows o with the power to X in situations of kind ∑
given that o also has other properties Γ iff, if o has F and Γ, it will X in a situation of kind ∑.
For consider the following statement:
If o is such that George Bush is president, and o has the properties {being a boulder, being So, given CCP1 and the CRP, the property of being such that George Bush is president emerges as a genuine property.
The problem with CCP1 is obvious enough. The left hand side of CCP1, with its use of 'endows', treats whether o has F as making a difference to which powers o will have, provided that it also has the properties in Γ. But this claim about making a difference has been stripped from CCP1's right hand side. So CCP1 leaves out an essential part of the relation between possession of a genuine property and possession of conditional causal powers: the fact that possession of a genuine property makes a difference to which conditional causal powers an object has.
As a first step towards rectifying this problem, we might move from CCP1 to (CCP2) Possession of property F endows o with the power to X in situations of kind ∑ given other properties Γ iff, if o has F and Γ, it will X in a situation of kind ∑, and o will not X in this kind of situation given Γ alone.
But CCP2 will not do either. For consider this claim:
If Jack is such that George Bush is president, and Jack has the property of being able to discriminate person-sized objects against different coloured backgrounds at distances of up to 1000 feet, then Jack will see the president if looking in the right direction in a situation where George Bush is 1000 feet away in appropriate lighting conditions; and if Jack lacks the property of being such that George Bush is president he will not see the president in this situation.
This claim is true. And it combines with CCP2 to entail that the property of being such that George Bush is president does endow Jack with a conditional causal power. So, like CCP1, (ii) for some Γ 1 ,…,Γ n some X 1 ,…,X n and some ∑ 1 , …, ∑ n , where the Γ i , X i , and ∑ i are sufficiently varied, if o has F and Γ i it will X i iff introduced into a situation of kind ∑ i and will not X i in this kind of situation given Γ i alone.
CCP3 captures the fact that to count as endowing an object with a conditional causal power possession of a property must make a difference to the object's causal embedment in the world -to how the object will behave given a range of other properties and across a range of situations.
And now recall the various glosses philosophers have given on the notion of a 'sortal concept'. These include the following. κ is a sortal concept iff the question How many things falling under κ are there in such and such a region of the world? always has a determinate answer 18 . κ is a sortal concept iff for all x, if x falls under κ no part of x also falls under κ
19
. κ is a sortal concept iff for all x, if x falls under κ the question 'What is it?', when asked with respect to x, may be answered by saying that x falls under κ
20
. κ is a sortal concept iff the fact that x is a κ determines which changes x can undergo without ceasing to exist 21 . κ is a sortal concept iff the things falling under κ share a characteristic kind of way of behaving 22 .
Lack of clarity about the relations between these various notions of sortal concept, and about which notion is at issue in any particular instance, is a long-standing source of behave given a variety of properties in a variety of situations -just is to give (one) answer to the question 'What is this object?', and to give (one) classification of the object in terms of a characteristic way of behaving. 24 So examination of the notion of a conditional causal power has led us to the conclusion that whether possession of a property endows an object with conditional causal powers, and which conditional causal powers these are, depends on the object's kind.
This conclusion entails a special form of the sortal dependence of property ascription (claim 3 in the argument from the start of the section). Here is how. Let us say that a 'genuine' property ascription is an ascription to an object of a property that would endow the object with conditional causal powers if the object actually had it. (So 'I am 170cm tall' is a genuine property ascription and 'I am such that George Bush is president'
is not.) In addition, let us say that S 'grasps a property ascription as genuine' iff S knows that it is a genuine property ascription. And now let us ask what epistemic situation S must be in if S is to grasp an ascription of F to o as genuine.
One possibility is that for some kind κ, S knows that o is a κ, and knows a range of the causal implications of possession of F for κ's. In this case, S is in a position to grasp an ascription of F to o as genuine in virtue of knowing a specific range of conditional causal powers with which possession of F would endow o.
A second possibility is that, though not knowing o's kind, S knows that there is some kind κ such that members of κ would be endowed with conditional causal powers by possession of F, and o is a κ. In this case, S is in a position to grasp an ascription of F to o as genuine in virtue of knowing that there is some range of conditional causal powers with which possession of F would endow o, though S does not know which range this is. So to grasp an ascription of F to o as genuine, S must either know o's kind, or know that o belongs to some range of kinds for which F-ness is causally significant. And that is the weak sortal dependence of property ascription for the special case of property ascriptions grasped as genuine.
To complete the argument for rich referential sortalism, it remains to show that claim 2 in the argument stated at the start of the section (the claim that to be in a position to say things, right or wrong, about an object you have to be in a position to ascribe properties to it) can be upgraded, for the case of things picked out perceptually, to 2* To be in a position to say things, right or wrong, about an object picked out perceptually you must be in a position to grasp some ascriptions of properties to the object as genuine.
But if the distinction between genuine and spurious properties is allowed its intuitive bite in the first place, it carries this upgrade with it. For the intuitive notion of a 'genuine'
property -the notion we appealed to causal relevance to explain -is just the notion of a property that you would have to mention to give a complete account of what there is in the spatio-temporal world. The 'genuine' properties and changes are the properties and changes which would have to be included in a complete account of the history of the spatio-temporal world; the 'spurious' properties and changes could be omitted without loss of information because they are just superfluous constructions out of the properties spatiotemporal things really have and the changes they really undergo. But we can pick out perceptually only objects that are apparently located in the space around us. So to suppose that 2* is false is to suppose that you could be in a position to understand claims about a spatio-temporal thing even though you had no grasp of any difference that the truth of any of these claims might make to a right account of the history of the spatio-temporal world.
Putting together the pieces now on the table, the argument for rich referential sortalism that I want to propose goes like this:
[The rich sense of 'refer to' from §1.] 2* To be in a position to say things, right or wrong, about an object picked out perceptually, you have to be in a position to grasp some ascriptions of properties to the object as genuine. It is important to emphasize that the sense of 'refer to' in this argument is the rich sense from §1, and that the argument is (therefore) an argument for rich referential sortalism rather than appropriation sortalism. So it is consistent with 4 to allow that a subject may be in a position to introduce an object picked out perceptually as relevant to the conversation from his or her point of view without being in a position to ascribe properties grasped as genuine to the object, and without knowing that for some κ the object belongs to κ. In a case of this kind, the subject is in a position to 'appropriate' o (that is, 'refer to' o in the minimal sense distinguished in §1), but not to 'refer to' o in the rich sense. And I take the argument from §2 to have established that in fact the capacity to appropriate perceived objects does not rest on the capacity to classify them. So I am allowing both of the following:
(i) A perceptual link with an object may put an ordinary adult subject in a position to introduce o as relevant to the conversation from his or her point of view even though he or she does not know that, for some kind κ, o is a κ.
(ii) A subject who has yet to acquire, or has lost the capacity to ascribe predicates grasped CASE 1 You stumble upon a thing of a kind you have not come across before. You have no idea where it might fit in your system of sortal classification -whether it is animal, vegetable, or mineral; whether it is an artefact or something that came to exist without human intervention. But it seems that you can refer to it, in the richer sense of 'refer': there it is, sitting on your desk, and you say 'That is yellow; it is cubical; I wonder what it is'. CASE 2 You are receiving a lot of perceptual information from a thing, and much of it is veridical. But, carelessly, you misapply your capacity to classify, and reach a wrong conclusion about the kind of thing it is. (You conclude that it is a person when actually it is a very life-like waxwork.) But it seems that you can refer (richly) to the thing: when you say 'He's standing inside the rope-line', you seem to be ascribing a property to the thing you are mistaken about.
CASE 3 You can see a thing moving around in the distance. It is too far away for you to
tell what kind of thing it is. But it seems that you can refer (richly) to it (you and your friend might be wondering whether it is a bird, a plane, or superman, and trying to work out how fast it is actually moving.) CASE 4 Your attention has been caught by what seems to you to be an animal in the shadows. Actually there is no ordinary object there. The 'thing' (or 'visual object') that you are attending to is just a thickening in the pattern of light and dark. It seems that you are in a position to refer (richly) to the thing: otherwise you would not be in a position to speculate about its size and likely fierceness.
The standard sortalist response to these examples has been to make a blanket appeal to the distinction between strong and weak versions of sortalism drawn at the start of §3. Philosophers making this response acknowledge that the examples do undermine strong sortalism:
If S can refer to o then, for some kind κ, S knows that o belongs to κ.
But they contend that the examples do not undermine weak sortalism:
If S can refer to o then S knows that, for some kind κ, o belongs to κ.
Proponents of the standard response then claim that they are endorsing only weak sortalism, and that in each of cases 1 -4, though the strong sortalist demand (for knowledge which kind o falls under) is not met, the weak sortalist demand (for knowledge that there is some kind that o falls under) is.
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At first sight, the argument for sortalism I have presented seems to provide an ideal set-up for this standard response. For the argument is an argument for weak sortalism. So the standard response -suggesting that the examples are not counterexamples to weak sortalism -looks like a natural move.
However, I want to suggest that the standard response is a mistake. As a first indication why, consider the fact that, on the face of it, Cases 1-4 seem to be of quite different kinds. Cases 1 and 3 are cases of classification apparently withheld, rather than cases of misclassification. And they are cases in which you withhold classification for different reasons. In Case 1 you know a lot about the thing -all its observable properties are transparent to you -it is just that you cannot classify it because you cannot tell where it fits in your system of sortal classification. In Case 3 your inability to classify seems to trace to a quite different source -you cannot classify the thing because it is so far away that you cannot discern its basic observable properties (like colour, shape, texture, and degree of solidity). Cases 2 and 4 are cases of misclassification, rather than classification withheld. But, again, they are cases in which classification seems to fail for very different reasons. In Case 4 you are hazarding a classification on the basis of sketchy information (the thing seems to have a shape, colour, and degree of solidity which it in fact lacks). In Case 2, your information about the thing is mostly veridical -you are right about many of the thing's basic observable properties. And most of the time if you classify as a person a thing with these basic observable properties you will be right. It is just that in this situation your usually reliable method of classification goes awry. So cases 1 -4 look, on the face of it, very different. But the standard sortalist response gives them a uniform treatment -it treats them all as cases in which you know that the thing falls under some kind without knowing which.
I suggest that the blanket appeal to weak sortalism in response to cases 1 -4
obscures the way the relation between demonstrative reference and sortal classification actually works. The rest of this section uses the argument for rich referential sortalism from §3 to develop an alternative treatment of the problem examples that sets this mistake right.
The alternative treatment is built around the role that argument of §3 assigns to the capacity to classify a thing in enabling a subject to refer to it demonstratively. According to this argument, the capacity to refer demonstratively depends on the capacity to classify because to refer to a thing demonstratively you need to be able to grasp ascriptions to the object of some properties as genuine; grasp of an ascription to o of F as genuine requires either knowing some of the specific conditional causal powers with which possession of F would endow o, or knowing that possession of F would endow o with some conditional causal powers though you do not know which. The more specific type of knowledge requires knowing the object's kind, and the less specific requires knowing that the object is a member of a kind for which F is causally significant. of classifiability iff you know no specific causal implications, but know that the object belongs to a kind for which a specific range of properties is causally significant.
Armed with these two criteria, let us consider each kind of problem example in turn.
First consider examples like Case 1. In this kind of example, a thing's observable properties are transparent to you, but you have no idea where to place it in your system of sortal classification. The standard sortalist move has been to acknowledge that in this situation you do not know the thing's kind, but argue that you do know that it is a thing of a kind. But if the argument for sortalism I have proposed is right, this application of the standard move is wrong. For in Case 1 there is a range, though a small one, of conditional causal powers with which you can tell that specific genuine properties endow things of o's kind. Suppose you can see that the thing is cubical and yellow. You pick it up. It holds its shape under the pressure of your grip. You put it on the desk, where it sits, yellow and cubical. You can push it around with a finger. In this case, you know that the thing has the power to stay at rest on the ground, or on a flat wooden surface, given its observed colour, shape, and mass; the power to hold a constant shape and colour under the kind of pressure exerted by your grip and through a change in position; the power to slide across a flat wooden surface given a small push, and, again, given the shape, colour, mass, and degree of smoothness that you have observed it to have. In this kind of case, where the thing's observable properties are transparent to you, you are watching a section of its causal history unfold in front of you. You can see its interactions with other objects. You can see how its properties are developing given external influences. So, for the properties you can see (or otherwise perceive) that the thing has, you know a basic range of conditional causal powers with which possession of these properties endows the thing. In this case you do have specific knowledge which kind of thing you are dealing with: it is a thing of this kind, a thing which behaves in these ways given these properties and this stable situation. Next consider Case 3 (the case of the thing visible only as a speck moving around in the distance). Suppose that the thing seems to be moving in the way characteristic of material objects (for example, tracing out a continuous spatiotemporal path). And suppose that whatever qualitative changes the thing seems to be undergoing are explicable in terms of a combination of changes in viewing conditions (maybe it is getting closer or farther away, or passing through a semi-opaque cloud or a shadow) and changes in a causally unified thing. In this case, you would be justified in believing that the thing is an ordinary material object. So if it actually is an ordinary material object (as opposed to just appearing to behave like one) you are in a position to know that it is. But the class of ordinary material objects just is the class of things for which we know observable properties to have causal implications. (It is doubtful that observable properties have causal implications for non-ordinary 'things' such as shadows, reflections, and mereological sums. But even if they do, knowledge that they do does not play a role in ordinary demonstrative reference, for we as ordinary speakers have no such knowledge.) So in this case you are in a position to know that, for some κ for which observable properties are causally significant, o is a κ.
And here the move that the standard response to the problem examples insists on across the board is the right one: your capacity to refer to the thing is secured by the fact that you know that it is classifiable, though you are not in fact in a position to classify it.
Because this is where my treatment of the supposed counterexamples to sortalism lies closest to the standard response, I shall take a little time to set out the differences between the standard response and my own appeal to weak sortalism. There are three main points of comparison. In the first exchange you seem to be treating me as referring to a thing (a shadow) that I then misclassify. In the second you seem to be treating me as failing to refer.
Given that both exchanges are coherent, it seems that ordinary speaker intuition does not produce a consistent result with respect to whether cases like Case 4 involve successful reference. So these examples raise a challenge that an account of how demonstrative reference works should be able to meet: to explain, in terms of the conditions for successful demonstrative reference, why ordinary speaker intuition should deliver conflicting results about this kind of case.
And once this challenge has been recognised, Case 4 emerges as raising just as much of a problem for anti-sortalists as it does for sortalists. A token of 'I' refers to the agent who produces it.
Given this rule, the computer-generated token of 'I' does not refer. But it does appropriate.
It appropriates the object that produces it. It is because this object does not meet an extra condition required by the reference-fixing rule (that the referent be an agent) that the token does not refer. And note that, even though the token of 'I' in the example does not refer, it serves as the antecedent of an anaphoric pronoun that does ('it' in 'it's just my computer').
So an indexical that merely appropriates an object can serve as the antecedent to an anaphoric pronoun that refers to it.
I want to suggest that Case 4 (where my attention has been caught by a thickening in the shadows) should be understood in this same way. When I say 'That is a dog', my use of 'that' appropriates the visual object I am attending to. I believe that F-ness would have one set of causal implications for the object (the causal implications that F-ness has for a dog). Actually, the causal implications of F-ness for the object that my use of 'that' appropriates would be very different. So I am not in a position to grasp ascriptions of genuine properties to the thing appropriated by my use of 'That'. So, given the argument of §3, this is a case of appropriation without reference. But an anaphoric pronoun can refer even though its antecedent merely appropriates (just as in the case of computer-generated 'I'). When you say 'No, it's just a shadow', your use of 'it' refers to the thing that you are in a position to refer to though I was not. The alternative response, 'No, it's nothing' is the parallel to 'It's nobody' in the 'I' case: a response that acknowledges that the initial demonstrative does not refer to the object it appropriates. 12 Note that to deny the traditional two-stage account of mental or physical pointing (pointing indicates a direction; sortal concepts draw boundaries around an object in that direction) is not to deny that sortal concepts may sometimes have a role to play in achieving determinate pointing. For it may be that sortal concepts sometimes play a role in orienting attention towards one rather than another visual object. Both the arm and the whole chair are there to attend to. One rather than another may be rendered salient by some cue (as in the automatic spread of attention and multiple object tracking experiments). If there is no such cue, a sortal concept might be needed to draw attention to a specific visual object. This suggestion is developed in Campbell (2002) : 61-83.
supposes bundles of properties to have: '…it is typically built into the nature of a property that in the absence of external influences (or of a change in external influences) a thing having that property will continue to have it' (Shoemaker (2003b): 254) . But, though it is not possible to argue for this point properly here, Shoemaker's notion of inertia among bundles of properties cannot provide the kind of 'baseline' that the notion of a conditional causal power requires. For an object's properties just do not have the kind of stability that Shoemaker is supposing. I discuss this point in a little more detail in Dickie (2010) : 527-528. 25 A full discussion would bring out the connections between the sortalist proposal I have advanced in this section, the role of sortal classification in enabling us to reidentify objects after breaks in observation, and the developmental psychology literature on acquisition of the capacity to reidentify (see Xu (2007) for a summary). But it is not practicable to develop these connections here. 26 For examples like this in the anti-sortalist literature, see Ayers (1974) , (1997) 
